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There is no question that ... these prior appropriatorsof water are entitled
to have the St. Vrah; creek flow unimpairedin quantityand unpolluted in any
peimanent or unreasonable way. The law which entitles parties to preserve
the purity of the streams whose waters are thebrs by ... appropiationis so
thoroughly well settled. . .
/A/ conmon law theoty based on ... piorappropnation... prohibits the
discharge of contamibates M'to streams where dohig so makes the water unsuitable for an appropriator'snornaluse of the water.'

Colorado law guarantees an appropriator the right to continue to receive
water of sufficient quality to allow the appropriator to make continued normal
use of that water.' This has been the law in Colorado for over a century.' HowThe author would like to thank Michael O'Connell for planting the seed for this article
and Jeff Houpt for supporting my water law interests. I would also like to thank my wife,
Kathryn Kuhlenberg, for all her support in writing this article.
1. Cushman v. Highland Ditch Co., 33 P. 344, 345 (Colo. App. 1893).
2. In re Plan for Augmentation of the City and Cnty. of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019, 1028 (Colo. 2002).
3. See, e.g., id.; City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91 (Colo. 1996);
Game & Fish Comrnm'n v. Farmers Irrigation Co., 426 P.2d 562, 566 (Colo. 1967); Slide Mines,
Inc. v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 77 P.2d 125, 127 (Colo. 1938); Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, Inc.,
44 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Colo. 1934); Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 105 P. 1093,
1095 (Colo. 1909); Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling
Co., 48 P. 828, 832 (Colo. App. 1897); Cushnan,33 P. at 345.
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ever, for some reason, much of the water law community in Colorado appears
to function under the belief that water quality may not be protected by water
courts, except in extremely limited circumstances explicitly provided for in the
Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 (the "1969 Act").'
For example, the 1969 Act expressly prohibits changing a water right if such
change will "injuriously affect" a vested water right and requires that a substitute supply plan provide substitute water of sufficient quality to permit senior
appropriators to continue their normal use of the water.' This view of the 1969
Act leads many in Colorado to accept the notion that water quality is generally
divorced from Colorado's prior appropriation law and that the Colorado Water Quality Control Act (the "WQCA") and various federal statutes' govern
water quality." This generally accepted notion that Colorado prior appropniation law regulates quantity but not quality is perhaps best explained by the
Federal District Court of Colorado's oversimplified explanation of Colorado
water law:
Colorado regulates water quality and quantity through two separate entities.
Water quality is the province of the Colorado Water Quality Control Commission and the Water Quality Control Division which were created by the
Water Quality Control Act.. . . Water quantity, on the other hand, is governed by the prior appropriation system regulated by the judiciary and the
water court."
Despite the general acceptance of this dichotomy of Colorado water law,
an analysis of case law, the 1969 Act, and the WQCA demonstrates that water
courts do have the authority to protect water quality. This authority is not limited to addressing water quality in substitute supply plans or change applications. Instead, water courts are charged with adjudicating "water matters,"
which includes, by the courts' definition, preventing injury to senior appropriators. This authority to protect senior appropriators from injury includes the
authority to protect the quality of the water senior appropriators receive, inde-

4. See, e.g., Humphreys, 105 P. at 1095; Suffolk, 48 P. at 832; Cushman, 33 P. at 345.
5. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2012).
6. Id. 3 7 -9 2 -3 05(3)(a).
7. Id. § 37-92-305(5).
8. COLO. REV. STAT. %§25-8-101 to -803 (2012).
9. See, e.g., Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1964); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
SS 1251-1274 (1972); Wild & Scenic Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1968); Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1973).
10. See City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1,91 (Colo. 1996).
11. Colo. Wild, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1192 (D. Colo.
2000) (internal citations omitted). Much scholarship to date also appears to accept this dichotomy without significant analysis. See, e.g., Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water
Ri'hts Protectionin Water Quahty Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 842 (1989); Jan G. Laitos,
Assault on the Citadel, PartI Water Quality Laws and the Exercise of Water Rights, 1715
COLO. LAw. 1305, 1305-06 (1988); Mark T. Pifher, Quaity Versus Quantity: The Continued
Right to Appmpliate-Part1, 15 COLO. LAw. 1035 (1986); Mark T. Pifher, Quahty Versus
Quantity: The ContinuedRighttoAppropiate-Partl,15 COLO. LAw. 1204 (1986).
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pendent of any statutory authorization allowing the water courts to consider
water quality.
Water courts have the authority to protect a senior appropriator's right to
clean water during an application for new water rights. This authority is not
new or novel, but is merely part of the prior appropriation system that has
operated in Colorado for nearly 150 years. The prior appropriation system is
designed to protect the rights of senior appropriators to receive usable water
before junior appropriators may receive their water. Therefore, because the
prior appropriation system is generally concerned with the allocation of water
between various water users, many Colorado water law practitioners' work
focuses on Water quantity, not water quality. However, the Colorado water law
community must fully recognize that Colorado prior appropriation water law,
independent of statutory schemes like the WQCA, protects water quality. Water law practitioners in Colorado should use the water court's authority to fully
protect their clients' water rights.
This article first provides a brief overview of Colorado water law and the
prior appropriation system to give the reader sufficient background to understand the remainder of the article. Second, the article explains the welldeveloped and centuries-old case law that demonstrates senior appropriators
have a right to continue to receive water of sufficient quality to allow them to
make continued normal use of their water. Third, the article discusses a water
court's authority to address water quality and analyzes why the water courts
should protect senior appropriators' rights to clean water. Finally, the article
addresses why the WQCA does not divest the water courts of the authority to
protect water quality.

I. BRIEF HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF COLORADO WATER IAW
Numerous detailed writings explore the history of prior appropriation and
Colorado water law." While a full and robust history of prior appropriation
law and Colorado water law is beyond the scope of this article, a working understanding the history of prior appropriation and Colorado water law is necessary.
Colorado water law is based on prior appropriation," a doctrine focused
on property-right allocation and administration, which aims to promote optimum use of a finite resource." The prior appropriation system originated in
California mining camps as a system for resolving disputes over mining
claims." Because of the lack of rules regarding the ownership of mining claims
on federal land, the miners adopted a doctrine of first in time-first in right.
12. See, e.g., GEORGE VRANESH, COLORADO WATER LAw (1987); Michael F. Browning &
Steve Bushong, A Summary of Colorado Water Law, 21 COLO. LAw. 1155 (1992); GregorvJ.
Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Oveniew 1 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1
(1997).
13. Pior Appropration Law, COLO. Div. OF WATER RES., http://water.state.co.us/
surfacewater/swrights/pages/priorapprop.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
14. Hobbs, supra note 12, at 2.
15. VRANESH, supra note 12, at 17.
16. Id.
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This entitled the first miner on a piece of land to claim the land while any subsequent claimant had no claim to that same land." The miners began to use
the same theory to resolve water disputes. In adopting this new first in timefirst in right doctrine, the miners rejected riparian law, the common law theory
that governed water use and allocation in the eastern United States, which was
inherited from English common law."
Understandably, these early California miners replaced riparian law with a
new first in time-first in right rule." While riparian law may have worked in
lush England and the eastern United States, where there are many rivers and
abundant rainfall, it was unworkable in the western United States. The harsh
geographic and climatic realties of the West, where there is relatively little rainfall and the primary source of water is runoff from mountain snowpack, which
is not consistent year-round, forced these early California miners and other
settlers to adapt. Courts throughout the western United States began to adopt
prior appropriation as the guiding principle for their states' water law, with the
first reported case being the 1855 California Supreme Court decision in Ii2n
V.Philps."

As settlers began to arrive in Colorado, they too realized that riparian law
would not work in the state. In 1876, Colorado expressly adopted prior appropriation in Article XVI of its Constitution:"
Section 5
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the

State of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and
the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Generally, under riparian law, the right to use water is vested in riparian landowners,
and a riparian landowner has the ability to make reasonable use of water as long as the use does
not unreasonably interfere with the quality or quantity of water flowing to a downstream riparian
user. See, e.g., Sratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 103 N.E. 87, 88 (Mass. 1913) ("A proprietor may make any reasonable use of the water of the stream in connection with his riparian
estate and for lawful purposes within the watershed, provided he leave the current diminished
by no more than is reasonable, having regard for the like right to enjoy the common property by
other riparian owners.").
20. Hobbs, supm note 12, at 3-4.
21. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855) ("[The policy of the State ... has conferred the
privilege to work the mines, [and it has equally conferred the right to divert the streams from
their natural channels, and as these two rights stand upon an equal footing, when they conflict,
they must be decided by the fact of priority, upon the maxim of equity, qwipnior estin temporte
potior est injure. The miner, who selects a piece of ground to work, must take it as he finds it,
subject to prior rights. . .. ").

22. COLO. CONST. amend. XVI, §§ 5-6. Soon after adoption of the Constitution, the Colorado Supreme Court in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch, 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882) held riparian law is
"inapplicable to Colorado."
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Section 6
The right to divert the unappropriated water of any natural stream to beneficial use shall never be denied."
To administer the prior appropriation system, the General Assembly
passed laws aimed at identifying existing irrigation rights through judicial proceedings and creating a system for the administration of water rights by water
officials." Colorado's prior appropriation law has continued to develop judicially and statutorily from the early days of statehood, with perhaps the most
significant development being the General Assembly's passage of the Water
Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 ("1969 Act")."
The 1969 Act provides the statutory framework for "implementing the
constitutional right to appropriate unappropriated water of any natural stream
to beneficial use."' The 1969 Act established seven special district courts,
called "water courts," according to the seven major drainage basins in Colorado." The water courts have exclusive jurisdiction over "water matters,"" and
have jurisdiction to resolve some ancillary matters as well." The 1969 Act provides that anyone seeking a water right; approval of a change of a water right;
approval for an augmentation plan or exchange; a finding for reasonable diligence; or approval to use water outside the state pursuant to Section 37-81-101
of the Colorado Revised Statutes, must file an application with the water court
in the district where the water right is located." Any person may oppose any
such application by filing a timely statement of opposition with the water
court.' Usually, after an application is filed, it is referred to a water referee who
then works with the parties in interest to resolve any issues without involving
the water judge." If for some reason the parties cannot resolve the dispute before the referee, the case is re-referred to the water court, where a full trial

23. COLO. CONST. amend. XVI, §§ 5-6.
24. See, e.g., 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 99-100; 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 142.
25. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-101 (2012). For a detailed discussion of the 1969 Act, see
Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado's 1969 Adjudication andAdrwnistration Act: SetiingIn, 3 U.
DENv. WATER. L. REv. 1 (1999).
26. Danielson v.Vickroy, 627 P.2d 752, 757 (Colo. 1981).
27. COLO. REv. STAT. S 37-92-201 (Greeley, Division 1 (South Platte and other northeastern plains rivers); Pueblo, Division 2 (Arkansas and other southeastern plains rivers); Alamosa,
Division 3 (Rio Grande and San Luis rivers); Montrose, Division 4 (Gunnison and other central
Western rivers); Glenwood Springs, Division 5 (Colorado River from source to state line);
Steamboat Springs, Division 6 (Yampa, White, North Platte, and other northwestern rivers);
and Durango, Division 7 (San Juan, Dolores, and other southwestern rivers)).
28. Id. § 37-92-203(1).
29. Crystal Lake Water & Sewage v. Backlund, 908 P.2d 534, 543 (Colo. 1995) ("The water
court also has jurisdiction to resolve ancillary matters that would directly affect the outcome of
matters over which it has exclusive jurisdiction.").
30. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(a).
31. Id. S 37-92-302(1)(b), (c).
32. Id. §§ 37-92-301(2) to -304; Co. ST. UNIF. WATER CT. R. 6.
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subject to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (as modified by a few special
water court rules") is conducted."
All surface and groundwater in, or tributary to, all natural streams in Colorado are subject to appropriation." To acquire a water right, one must physically appropriate the water." There are two types of water rights in Colorado:
absolute rights and conditional rights. Before a water court will decree an absolute right, an applicant must show that it "diverted, stored, or otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled" the water and applied that water to a beneficial use." The 1969 Act contains a nonexclusive list of beneficial uses." A water
court can also decree a conditional right." Unlike an absolute right, a conditional right does not require the applicant to show it has actually put the water
to a beneficial use." Instead, a water court will decree a conditional right if the
applicant shows it formed the requisite intent to appropriate and took some
physical steps toward appropriation." Additionally, the applicant must show

33. Co. ST. UNIF. WATER CT. R. 1.
34. COLO. REv. STAT. S 37-92-303(2). The referee must re-refer the case to the water judge
.at any time upon motion by the applicant or any opposer certifying that party's intent to protest
an adverse ruling of the referee. Id.
35. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6; COLO. REv. STAT. S 37 -92 -102(1)(a).
36. COLO. CONST. art. XIV, § 6; COLO. REv. STAT. § 3 7 -9 2 -305(9)(a). Because of the
Colorado Constitution's strong statement that "the right to divert unappropriated waters of any
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied," a water user is not required to adjudicate their water right. COLO. CONST. art. XIV, S 6. See also Cresson Consol. Gold & Mining
Co. v. Whitten, 338 P.2d 278, 283 (Colo. 1959) ("A decree in a water adjudication is only confirmatory of pre-existing rights; the decree does not create or grant any rights; it serves as evidence of rights previously acquired."). However, to incentivize adjudication, priorities in Colorado are determined based on both the appropriation date and the adjudication date. A water
right decreed in a later adjudication is to be administered as junior to any water right adjudicated
in an earlier adjudication. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-306, 92-401(l)(b)(III). This is known as
the "postponement doctrine." Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. King Consolidated Ditch Co., 250
P.3d 1226, 1246 (Colo. 2011); see also Dallas Creek Water Co. v. Huey, 933 P.2d 27, fn. 5
(Colo. 1997).
37. COLO. REv. STAT. S 3 7-92 -305(9)(a); Dalas Creek Water Co., 933 P.2d at 34 ("An
absolute decree confirms that amount of depletion from the stream that can be taken in priority
as a property right.").
38. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (listing "impoundment of water for recreational purposes, including fishery or wildlife, and also includes the diversion of water by a county, municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation district, water conservation district, or
water conservancy district for recreational in-channel diversion purposes."). Colorado courts
have recognized other beneficial uses. See, e.g, Zigan Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cache la Poudre
Water Users Ass'n, 758 P.2d 175, 182 (Colo. 1988) (recreational use); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 574 (Colo. 1979) (instream flow
use); City & Cnty. of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 841-42 (Colo. 1939) (municipal use); Lamborn v. Bell, 32 P. 989, 990-91 (Colo. 1893) (mining/industrial use); Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 26 P. 313, 316 (Colo. 1891) (agricultural use).
39. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Centennial Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of Broomfield, 256 P.3d
677, 685 (Colo. 2011); City of Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d
758, 761, 764 (Colo. 1985); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 642 P.2d 510, 512 (Colo. 1982).

Issue 2

PRIOR APPROPRIA TION AND WA TER QUALITY

301

that it "can and will" divert the water and put it to a beneficial use." A conditional water right can be made absolute by demonstrating the water has been
put to a beneficial use."
The water courts also adjudicate other types of applications, three of
which are directly relevant to this article: change applications, plans for augmentation, and exchange applications. A water right holder may apply to
change its water right with regard to things such as decreed type of use, decreed point of diversion, and decreed place of use." A water court cannot
grant a change application unless the change "will not. injuriously affect the
owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested right or a decreed
conditional water right.""
Like an appropriator seeking to change a water right, an appropriator applying for an augmentation plan or an exchange must also submit an application." Augmentation plans and exchanges each permit an appropriator to provide substitute water to a stream, thereby allowing the appropriator to use water that another appropriator had been using or is entitled to use." More specifically, an augmentation plan permits a water user to make out-of-priority
depletions by replacing its depletions with substitute water for use by senior
appropriators.' Thus, an augmentation plan operates outside of the priority
system."
Similarly, an exchange permits an appropriator to instantaneously replace
all diversions at an upstream point with a substitute supply of water at a downstream point." Unlike an augmentation plan, an exchange operates within the
priority system." A water court will not approve an augmentation plan or ex-42. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b); Dallas Creek Water Co., 933 P.2d at 35 ("Conditional decrees encourage the pursuits of projects designed to place waters of the state to beneficial uses by reserving an antedated priority, in light of the necessity to obtain and complete
financing, engineering, and the construction of works that will capture, possess, or otherwise
control the water.").
43. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(a); Mount Emmons Mining Co. v. Town of Crested
Butte, 40 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Colo. 2002). Every six years, the holder of a conditional right must
secure a finding of reasonable diligence from the Water Court. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92301(4)(a). "The measure of reasonable diligence is the steady application of effort to complete
the appropriation in a reasonably expedient and efficient manner under all the facts and circumstances." Id. § 37-92-301(4)(b). If the applicant fails to timely file a diligence application or court
does not make a finding of reasonable diligence, the conditional water right is abandoned. Id.§
37-92-301(4)(a)(I).
44. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302(1)(a).
45. Id. S 37-92-305(3)(a).
46. Id.§ 37-92-302(1)(a).
47. Centennial Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of Broomfield, 256 P.3d at 677,
683-85 (Colo. 2011).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 684 (citing Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1155
(Colo. 2001)).
50. Id. As an appropriative right, an exchange may be either conditional or absolute. Id.
The point between the upstream point where water is diverted and the downstream point where
substitute water is provided is called the exchange reach.
51. To the uninitiated, augmentation plans and exchanges appear to be the same and their
differences can be confusing, but for the purposes of this article, the important thing to recognize is the statutory protections senior appropriators are given in regards to augmentation plans
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change unless its operation will not injuriously affect vested rights 2 and any
substituted water is "of a quality and quantity [that] meets] the requirements
for which the water of the senior appropriator has normally been used."3

. . A COLORADO WATER RIGHT AND THE RIGHT TO CLEAN
WATER
A water right acquired under the Colorado prior appropriation system is a
property right.' The Colorado Supreme Court has gone so far as to call it
"among the most valuable property rights known to the law."' Because the
Colorado Constitution declares the water of every natural stream public property," an appropriator only has the right to use the watere (in other words, it is
a usufructuary right)." Generally, after use, the appropriator must return the
water to the stream for future appropriation and use."
It is helpful to think of a water right as the proverbial bundle of sticks, with
each stick representing a particular right, which, when combined, comprise a
water right. Some argue priority is the most valuable stick'" because it gives a
senior appropriator the near absolute right to receive its decreed amount of
water before junior appropriators may make diversions." There are a variety of
other property rights included in the water rights "bundle,"" but this article will
focus on an appropriator's right to continued receipt of water of sufficient
quality to make continued normal use of that water.

and exchanges. For a detailed explanation of the difference between an augmentation plan and
an exchange, see Id.
52. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37 -92 -3 05(3)(a).
53. Id § 37-92-305(5).
54. COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5.
55. White v. Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co., 43 P. 1028, 1030 (Colo. 1896).
56. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, S 5.
57. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37 -92 -102(a)(1).
58. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Colo. 1982) ("A usufructuary right
gives its holder the right to us and enjoy the property of another without impairing its substance.
In other words, water may be applied beneficially by the holder of a water right without destroying the resource; the water molecules are not altered by the use of the water. Unused or waste
water will be discharged back into the river system or otherwise recycled and therefore available
for use by other appropriators.").
59. Id.
60. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Pioity: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32
ENVTL. L. 37, 43 (2002).
61. To protect this right, a senior appropriator places a "call" on the river which has the
effect of curtailing the right of junior appropriators to receive their decreed water before the
senior calling right receives its full entitlement. The one exception to an appropriator's right to
receive his decreed amount of water is the "futile call" doctrine, which provides that if a senior
appropriator places a call on a stream, the flows being received by junior appropriators will not
be curtailed if that curtailment will not result in the senior appropriator actually receiving the
flows he is entitled under his priority. DAVID H. GErCHEs, WATER LAW INA NUTSHELL Ill
(4th ed. 2009).
62. For example, a water right can include the right to divert for a particular use, the right to
divert water at a particular point, the right to use the water on a particular piece of real
property,
the right to store water, etc. Id. at 168.
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Colorado case law is replete with cases in which the water court protected'
an appropriator's right to continued receipt of water of sufficient quality to
permit continued normal use of the water. Often times, the courts have been
asked to intervene in situations where one appropriator is polluting a stream to
such an extent that it prevents a downstream appropriator from putting her
water to beneficial use. The following cases are examples of decisions in which
the Colorado courts have protected the right to clean water:

*

*

*

*

Slide Mines, Inc. v Left Hand Ditch, Co.: The Colorado Supreme
Court held a nuisance' existed when defendant's discharge of mine
tailings into a creek prevented plaintiff farmers from using their appropriated water for irrigation and domestic use."
Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank The Colorado Supreme
Court held defendant was liable for damages when discharge of "poisonous tailings and slimes" upstream from plaintiff's point of diversion
"greatly injured" plaintiffs irrigated land. The Court also permanently
enjoined defendant from continuing such discharges."
Wim ore v. Chain O'Mines- The Colorado Supreme Court held a
nuisance existed when "mill tailings and slime" that defendant discharged into a stream caused significant damage to plaintiffs ditch and
irrigated land.'

Suffolk Gold Mining & Milhig Co. v. San Mvel Consol. Mining &
Milling Co.: The Colorado Court of Appeals found defendant liable
for damages where discharge of pollutants into a stream from its
stamp mill diminished the quality of the water, thereby severely damaging plaintiffs pipe that diverted water onto a Pelton wheel for production of electricity."

*

Game & Fish Commission v. FarmersImgation Company The Colo-

rado Supreme Court held defendant liable for damages when discharges from defendant's fish hatchery rendered plaintiffs domestic
water right unusable for domestic purposes. The Court also enjoined
defendant from continuing such discharges.'
In all of these cases, the respective court seems to apply the "thoroughly
well-settled" principle in Colorado water law entitling an appropriator to have
its water "unimpaired in quantity and unpolluted in any permanent or unrea-

63. Under Colorado law, to prove a private nuisance, "a plaintiff must establish that (1) the
defendant's conduct unreasonably interfered with the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs property, (2) the interference was so substantial that it would have been offensive or caused inconvenience or annoyance to a reasonable person in the community, and (3) the interference was
either negligent or intentional." St. John's Church in Wilderness v. Scott, 194 P.3d 475, 479
(Colo. App. 2008).
64. Slide Mines, Inc. v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 77 P.2d 125, 127 (Colo. 1938).
65. Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 105 P. at 1093, 1095 (Colo. 1909).
66. Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 44 P.2d 1024, 1026-28 (Colo. 1935).
67. Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 48 P.
828, 830-33 (Colo. App. 1897).
68. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Farmers Irrigation Co., 426 P.2d 562, 562 (Colo. 1967).
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sonable way."' In discussing this well-settled principle, the Colorado Supreme
Court in Humphreys even held, "upon general principles of law it is so entirely clear that defendant is liable in damages for this pollution, that we do not
cite authorities or deem it necessary to argue such a self-evident proposition."'
In City of Thornton v. Bt/ou rrgation Co., the Court identified the corollary
to this rule when it held "a water right does not include the right to discharge
pollutants that detrimentally affect downstream users.""
Like the Court did in City of Thornton, the cases cited above recognize
that water rights are not absolute: an appropriator's right to use of water is
sometimes qualified with respect to the right of other appropriators to use
water." The courts may limit the right to exercise a water right and the corresponding externalities imposed on downstream users ("[a] l property rights are
subject to the very equitable principle sic utere tuo ut aienum non laedas.") ."
While many of the cases cited above are a century or more old, the Colorado Supreme Court has not forgotten about this important principle of Colorado water law. In 2002, the Court reaffirmed the existence of a common law
theory based on prior appropriation that prohibits the discharge of contaminates into streams, where doing so makes the water unsuitable for an appropriator's normal use of it." Also, in 2001, while creating new common law
concerning when a landowner whose land is burdened by an irrigation ditch
may unilaterally alter the ditch, the Court held, inter alia, that unilateral alteration is only permitted if the alteration does not impair the quality of the water."
The Court's insertion of a water quality prong in the test for when a burdened
landowner may unilaterally alter an irrigation ditch demonstrates how the right
to clean water is deeply entrenched in Colorado water law.
Colorado courts have not yet specifically defined the precise quality of water an appropriator is entitled to receive. Instead, the measure of whether water is of "sufficient quality" appears to be a highly case-specific inquiry. Rather
than creating a particular metric for quality, courts seem to protect the right to
continued beneficial use of water. Thus, if the appropriator has historically
69. Cushman v. Highland Ditch Co, 33 P. 344, 345 (Colo. App. 1893) (emphasis added).
See also Larimer Cnty. Reservoir Co. v. Luthe, 9 P. 794, 796 (Colo. 1886) (noting that one can
use a reservoir or natural depression if no injury to existing water rights occurs. "He must see to
it that no legal right of prior appropriators, or of other persons, is an any way interfered with by
his acts. He cannot lessen the quantity of water, seriously impairits qual.
(emphasis
added)).
70. Humphreys, 105 P. at 1095.
71. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91. (Colo. 1996).
72. See, e.g., In re Plan for Augmentation of the City and Cnty. of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019,
1028 (Colo. 2002); City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 91; Game & Fish Comm'n, 426 P.2d 562;
Slide Mines, Inc. v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 77 P.2d 125, 126-27 (Colo. 1938); Wilmore v. Chain
O'Mines, 44 P.2d 1024, 1026-28 (Colo. 1935); Humphreys Tunnel& Mm. Co., 105 P. at 1095;
Suffolk Gold& Mmn& MLing Co., 48 P. at 830-32; Cushman, 33 P. at 345.
73. Sic utere tuo ut alienurnnon laedasmeans "use your own property in such a manner as
not to injure that of another." Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 434 (1989).
74. Suffolk, 48 P. at 832 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. City & Cnty. ofDenver,44 P.3d at 1028.
76. Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St. Jude's Co., 36 P.3d 1229, 1238 (Colo. 2001).
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appropriated water for a use that requires particularly clean water (for example, domestic use), any degradation of water quality may infringe on that right.
However, if the appropriator has historically appropriated water for a use that
does not require particularly clean water (for example, dust suppression), even
great degradation in quality may not infringe upon the appropriator's right to
clean water. The importance of the pardcular injury a court is protecting
against may be best illustrated by Wmore v. Chain O'Mines, in which the
Court defined pollution as "an impairment, with attendant injury, to the use of
the water that [downstream appropriators] are entitled to make. Unless the
introduction of extraneous matter so unfavorably affects such use, the condition created is short of pollution. In reality, the thng forbidden is injury.""
Stated another way, the courts protect the right to make continued beneficial
use of water.
The right to continued receipt of clean water as recognized by Colorado
courts is not novel or unique. In United States v. Gda Valley Irngation Disaic4
the Federal District Court for the District of Arizona recognized "[t he courts
of the western states generally agree that a prior appropriator of water is entitled to protection, including injunctive relief, against material degradation of
the quality of the water by junior appropriators upstream.""8 In recognizing this
protection, the court entered an injunction against upstream water users whose
irrigation return flows substantially increased the salt load of the Gila River,
which then prevented the Apache Indian Tribe from growing salt-sensitive
crops such as alfalfa." In addition to the Arizona District Court, state courts in
California," Utah," and Washington" have all recognized that one of the sticks
in the water rights bundle is the right to clean water. Additionally, the United
States Supreme Court recognized that a deterioration of quality may "constitute an invasion of the rights of the first appropriator"" and has protected water
quality under nuisance principles."
Colorado law protects an appropriator's right to continued receipt of water
of sufficient quality to allow continued normal use of the water," which effectively means that a senior appropriator has a right to make continued beneficial use of her water as she has in the past." This right allows a senior appro77. Wilmore, 44 P.2d at 1029 (emphasis added).
78. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1448 (D. Ariz. 1996).
79. Id. at 1454-56.
80. See Phoenix Water Co. v. Fletcher, 23 Cal. 481, 487 (1863).
81. See Salt Lake City v. Boundary Springs Water Users Ass'n, 270 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah
1954).
82. See Tiegs v. Watts, 954 P.2d 877, 884 (Wash. 1998).
83. Atchison v. Peterson, 87 U.S. 507, 514-15 (1874).
84. Ariz. Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 56-58 (1913) (upholding a decision by the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona that a mining company's operations constituted a
nuisance when its operations discharged tailings and other waste into tributaries of the Gila
River that so polluted the river that the water diverted for irrigation by a downstream appropriator caused damage to the appropriator's crops).
85. See, e.g., Suffolk Gold Mmnhg & Millg Co., 48 P. at 830-33; Humphreys Tunnel &
Mining Co., 105 P. at 1093, 1095; Wilmore, 44 P.2d at 1026-28; Slide MInes, Inc., 77 P.2d at
127; Game & Fish Comm'n, 426 P.2d at 562.
86.
Wdimore, 44 P.2d at 1029.
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priator to use the courts to protect the water it receives from any degradation
that will prevent continued beneficial use of that water." This rule, that senior
appropriators have the right to continued receipt of water of sufficient quality
for continued beneficial use, is merely the application of the ancient principle
of sic utere tu ut alienum non laedas." The courts are protecting a property
right, the right to clean water, and there is a general consensus in many prior
appropriation states that the right to clean water is a legally protected property
right. The more interesting question concerning CQlorado water law is exactly
when a water court may protect water quality.

m. HOW THE WATER COURT MAY ADDRESS WATER QUALITY
ISSUES
Below is a discussion of (i) under what circumstances the 1969 Act expressly requires water courts to protect water quality; and (ii) under what circumstances the water court has the authority to address water quality despite
no explicit authority being granted to it in the 1969 Act.
A. EXPRESS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS WATER QUALITY
The well-established right of an appropriator under Colorado law to make
continued beneficial use of water was partially codified in the 1969 Act. The
1969 Act provides that under augmentation plans and exchanges, "[alny substituted water shall be of a quality and quantity so as to meet the requkrements
for which the water of the senior appropriatorhas normally been used. . . .""
Similarly, the state engineer may not approve a substitute supply plan unless
the substitute supply plan "will replace all out-of-priority depletions in time,
location, and amount and will otherwise prevent injury to other water rights
and decreed conditional water rights, including water qualityand continuity to
meet the requirements of use to which the senior appropiationhas normally
been put. . . ."" These provisions expressly codify the common law principle

discussed above" (that an appropriator is entitled to make continued beneficial

87. See, e.g., la re Plan for Augmentation of the City and Cnty. of Denver, 44 P.3d 1019,
1028 (Colo. 2002); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 91 (Colo. 1996); Game
& Fish Comm'n v. Farmers Irrigation Co., 426 P.2d 562, 565 (Colo. 1967); Slide Mines, Inc. v.
Left Hand Ditch, Co., 77 P.2d 125, 127 (Colo. 1938); Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 44 P.2d
1024, 1027 (Colo. 1934); Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 105 P. 1093, 1095 (Colo.
1909); Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 48 P.
828, 830-32 (Colo. App. 1897); Cushman v. Highland Ditch Co., 33 P. 344, 345 (Colo. App.
1893).
88. "Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another." Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 434 (1989).
89. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(5) (emphasis added).
90. COLO. REv. STAT. S 37-92-308(4)(a)(V) (emphasis added); see also id. § 37-80-120(3)
("any substituted water shall be of a quality and contuity to meet the requirements of use to
which the senior appropriator has normally been put") (emphasis added).
91. City& Cnty. ofDenver, 44 P.3d at 1028.
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use of its water and any water quality degradation that infringes on that beneficial use is an invasion on an appropriator's water right)."
The 1969 Act contains several other provisions that expressly permit the
water court to address water quality in other situations. Section 37-92-305(3) (a)
of the Colorado Revised Statutes provides that a change of water right, implementation of rotational crop management plans, an augmentation plan, or
exchange may only be approved by the water court if it "will not injuriously
affect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right
or a decreed conditional water right."" Similarly, Section 37-92-305(3)(b) requires water courts to impose terms and conditions "necessary to prevent injury to vested water rights or decreed conditional water rights" in certain change
application concerning the lease, loan, or donation of water to the Colorado
Conservation Board for instrearn flows." Section 37-92-305(4)(a) includes a
nonexclusive list of terms and conditions the water court may impose to prevent injury under Section 37-92-305(3)(a) and (b), one of which explicitly addresses water quality.' Additionally, the water court may impose other necessary conditions in order to protect the rights of other appropriators."
The above discussion reaches the rather unextraordinary conclusion that
the 1969 Act expressly permits, and in some cases requires, water courts to
consider water quality. This conclusion is easily reached by merely reading the
statute. The more difficult question is discussed next: Can a water court address water quality when, in an application for a new junior water right (either
conditional or absolute), none of these statutory provisions identified above
are triggered?
B. THE WATER COURT'S AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS WATER QUALITY
WHEN ADJUDICATING A NEWJUNIOR RIGHT

Before the water court decrees a right absolute, the applicant must show
that it "diverted, stored, or otherwise captured, possessed, and controlled the
water" and has applied that water to a beneficial use." Unlike an absolute right,
a conditional right does not require the applicant to show it has put the water
to a beneficial use." Instead, the water court will decree a conditional right if
the applicant shows it formed the requisite intent to appropriate water and it
took some physical step to appropriate that water.' Additionally, the applicant
Pifher, The ContiuedRight to Appropriate-Pait1supra note 11, at 1035.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(3)(a).
94. Id. § 37-92-305(3)(b).
95. Id. S 37-92-305(4)(a)(V) ("A tern or condition that addresses decreases in water quality
caused by a change in the type of use and permanent removal from irrigation of more than one
thousand acre-feet of consumptive use per year that includes a change in point of diversion, if
the change would cause an exceedance ... attributable to the proposed change.").
96. Id. § 37-92-305(4)(a)(VI).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(a) (2012).
97.
98. Id. S 37-92-305(9)(b).
99. See, e.g., Centennial Water & Sanitation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of Broomfield, 256 P.3d
677, 685 (Colo. 2011); City of Aspen v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 696 P.2d
758, 761 (Colo. 1985); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
642 P.2d 510, 512 (Colo. 1982).
92.
93.
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must show that it "can and will" divert the water and put it to a beneficial use.'"
Nothing in the 1969 Act expressly requires or permits a water court to consider whether exercise of the new junior water right will injure senior rights.
However, when an applicant files an application for a new water right, water
courts do not merely ask if the statutory elements are met for an appropriation, instead objectors often prompt the court to inquire whether exercising
the new junior right will injure a senior right."
The Colorado Supreme Court "recognize[d] that there may be situations
in which any use by a junior appropriator would cause persistent injury to senior water users. In those cases, a water court must eliminate the injury by imposing conditions on the junior right."" Additionally, in City of Thornton, the
Court responded to the express argument that the water court does not have
the authority to address injury to senior rights when adjudicating a new junior
right when it held that "new conditional appropriations may be decreed subject to conditions designed to protect other appropriators against injury resulting from the appropriations.""
In City of Thornton, Thornton applied for various water rights for a large
water project, including various conditional rights." The water court decreed
the conditional rights but imposed a volumetric limitation on the exercise of
those rights, finding such a condition necessary to prevent injury to existing
water users." On appeal, Thornton argued the water court was not authorized
to apply a no-injury standard to appropriations outside of cases involving water
rights changes or augmentation plans." Despite the lack of express statutory
authority to address injury during an application for a new water right, the
Colorado Supreme Court held a water court may condition a new water right
to protect existing water rights." Subsequently, the Court remanded the case to
the water court, ordering the water court to make factual findings on the potential injury to existing water users if the volumetric limitations were imposed
to prevent such injury." In short, the Court in City of Thornton expressly held
that a water court may impose conditions on a new water right if it makes specific findings identifying the injury the conditions are intended to prevent.
The Court's action in City of Thornton is not unique. Colorado courts often impose terms and conditions on the exercise of a new water right to pre100. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b).
101.
See, e.g., Fox v. Div. Eng'r for Water Div. 5, 810 P.2d 644, 645-46 (Colo. 1991); Se.
Colorado Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1984) (reversed on other grounds); Lionelle v. Se. Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 676 P.2d 1162,
1167-68 (Colo. 1984); Bohn v. Kuiper, 575 P.2d 402, 403 (Colo. 1978).
102. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Ltd. P'ship, 929 P.2d 718, 724
(Colo. 1996). See also Three Bells Ranch Assocs. v. Cache La Poudre Water Users Ass'n, 758
P.2d 164, 170 (Colo. 1988) ("In situations where a junior right cannot be exercised without
injury to a senior right, we have required the injury to be eliminated by imposing conditions on
the exercise of the junior right.").
103. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 48 (Colo. 1996).
104. Id. at 21.
105. Id.at 22, 47.
106. Id. at 48.
107. Id. at 48-49.
108. Id. at 49.
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vent injury to senior appropriators.' Also, there are numerous cases in which
a water court found that, although there may be unappropriated water in the
stream at some times of the year, a new water right, absent an augmentation
plan, will not be granted so as to prevent injury to senior appropriators.'
Admittedly, the author has found no case where a water court conditioned
a new water right to prevent injury to an existing right based on water quality,
but there is no reason the water courts cannot do so. As the discussion in Section III indicates, an appropriator has the legal right to make continued beneficial use of its water, just as it has the right to continued receipt of a certain
amount of water in priority. If the water court can condition the exercise of a
new water right to insure that senior appropriators continue to receive a certain
quantityof water at a certain time, it can condition a water right to insure that a
senior appropriator continues to receive a certain quality of water. Both the
right to water in priority and the right to make continued beneficial use of water are protected property rights, and there is no good reason for the water
court to provide protection to the priority right but not the quality right.
A hypothetical may help illustrate when a water court may find it appropriate to condition, or even deny, a new water right in order to protect a senior
appropriator's right to clean water. Assume Natural Gas Development Company, LLC ("Company") files an application for a new conditional direct-flow
right and two conditional storage rights on a small stream located high in the
Rockies at 9,000 feet. The direct-flow right will be used to fill ponds A and B.
Pond A is designed to hold ten acre feet and pond B will hold three acre feet.
Pond A is an on-channel reservoir and pond B is off-channel and Company
will construct it within fifty feet of the stream. Unlike pond A, which Company
can fill once every year, Company can fill pond B only once. After the initial
fill, Company will mix the water in pond B with hydraulic fracturing fluid and
use the mixture for hydraulic fracturing. After use, Company will retain the
injected water, fracturing fluid, and natural formation water that returns to the
surface (known as "produced water") in pond B and continually reuse it. Furthermore, Company's engineering plans indicate that ponds A and B and the
stream will all be connected via siphons and pipes. However, Company will
build the ponds so that after the initial fill, clean water from pond A and the
stream will be able to enter pond B, but the produced water from pond B will
not be able to flow into pond A or the stream. Company claims that even
though there are numerous water rights on the stream, there is unappropriated
water available and thus does not seek approval of an augmentation plan.
Your client, John, runs a small family farm with a relatively senior water
right for irrigation, stockwatering, and domestic use. John diverts his water
about one-half mile downstream from Company's proposed project where it
flows into a series of ditches serving his farm. Often, his livestock drink directly from the ditch. John is concerned that Company's natural gas development
109. See, e.g., Aspen Widemess Workshop, 929 P.2d at 725 (recognizing a water court's
imposed conditions designed to prevent out-of-priority depletions).
110. See, e.g., Fox, 810 P.2d at 645-46; Se. Colorado Water ConservancyDist, 688 P.2d at
718; Jionelle,676 P.2d at 1167-68; Bohn, 575 P.2d at 403.
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activities may negatively affect his farm and water rights, and he comes to you
for advice.
At this point, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of hydraulic
fracturing." The following is a brief explanation of hydraulic fracturing:
[In hydraulic fracturing fluids, chemical substances other than water make
up approximately 0.5 to 1 percent of the total volume, however, the very
large volumes used require correspondingly large volumes of a variety of
compounds. These substances range from the relatively benign to the highly
toxic. Some of these are reported to the public and others are not, but the
quantities and proportions used are largely considered trade secrets. In addition to these added chemicals, naturally occurring toxicants such as heavy
metals, volatile organics, and radioactive compounds are mobilized during
gas extraction and return to the surface with the gas/chemical mix
(wastewater); of the 5.5 million gallons of water, on average, used to hydraulically fracture a shale gas well one time, less than 30 percent to more than 70
percent may remain underground. Hydraulic fracturing takes place over 2 to
5 days and may be repeated multiple times on the same well over the course
of the potential 25- to 40-year lifetime of a well. Many of these chemicals are
toxic and have known adverse health effects, which may be apparent only in
the long ten."
Recently, scientists conducted a study aimed at reporting the health effects
caused by exposure to hydraulic fracturing fluid and produced water."' The
study documents twenty-four cases of exposure of humans and/or animals to
hydraulic fracturing fluid in six states-Colorado, Louisiana, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Texas."' Below is a list of four of the exposure events and
their results:
* Accidental release of fracturing fluids into a cow pasture adjacent to
the gas well resulted in the death of seventeen cows in one hour."'
* Accidental release of fracturing fluid into goat pasture resulted in goats
suffering reproductive problems for the following two years."'
* Of sixty head of cattle exposed to creek water into which someone allegedly dumped fracturing wastewater, twenty head died and sixteen
failed to produce calves the following spring."'
111.

Hydraulic fracturing is a highly contentious issue and this article does not aim to argue

for or against the practice. Instead, this article aims to use hydraulic fracturing, a common practice in much of Colorado, as a vehicle to demonstrate how the right to make continued beneficial use of water may be protected.
112.
Michelle Bamberger & Robert E. Oswald, Impacts of Gas Diillrig on Human and
Animal Health, 22 NEw SoLuroNs 51, 52 (2012) (citations omitted); see also Ryan Coyne,

Hydrwuhc Factunngand the Jipacs on Water Quality: Effott by the Departmentof Energy
to FRd Answers, U. DENV. WATER L. REV. BLOC
(Oct. 22, 2012),
http://duwaterlawreview.con/ydraulic-fracturing-and-the-impacts-on-water-quality-efforts-by-the-

department-of-energy-to-find-answers/.
113.

Bamberger & Oswald, supranote 112, at 53.

114.

Id.at54-59.

115.
116.
117.

Id. at 59.
Id
Id. at 60.
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Of 140 head of cattle exposed to fracturing wastewater when an alleged slit in the liner of a wastewater impoundment caused the
wastewater to drain into a pasture and pond used as stockwater for the
cows, seventy head died and there was a high incident of stillborn and
stunted calves among the remaining cattle."'
In short, science and experience show that, at the very least, hydraulic fracturing fluid is highly toxic because it can kill animals and significantly affect
their reproduction. Given these facts, John should be concerned about the
plan to store significant amounts of hydraulic fracturing fluid one-half mile
upstream of where he diverts his water for irrigation, stockwatering, and domestic use. There are serious questions as to whether the exercise of Company's water rights, if granted, may impair John's right to continued receipt of
clean water-given the harsh winters experienced at 9,000 feet, the potential for
stream flooding during spring runoff, and Company's suspect claim that even
though clean water can enter pond B from the stream and pond A, produced
water cannot leave pond B. This may be a case where John would want to
press for terms and conditions on Company's water rights to ensure protection
of water quality."' Alternatively, if John's counsel can prove that despite the
Company's claims, produced water will enter the stream from pond B and
negatively affect John's right to continued beneficial use of his water, it is possible thatJohn could convince the water court to deny Company's water rights'
application altogether."
The point of this hypothetical discussion is to demonstrate a situation
where a water attorney should be cognizant of the water court's authority to
address water quality. It may be possible for the attorney to secure terms and
conditions on, or even alter the design of, the proposed project to limit the
possibility that contaminated water will impair John's existing water rights.
However, without fully recognizing the water court's authority regarding water
quality and fully understanding a senior appropriator's right to make continued beneficial use of its water, the attorney would miss an important opportunity to fully protect a client's rights.
*

C. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED WHEN A WATER COURT DENIES OR
CONDITIONS THE GRANT OF A NEW WATER RIGHT
Whenever a water court conditions or denies the grant of a new water
right, one must necessarily grapple with the question of whether there is a violation of Colorado's constitutional guarantee of the right to appropriate unappropriated water. Article XVI, Section 6 of the Colorado Constitution provides "the right to divert unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied." Despite what appears to be absolute language suggesting that as long as there is unappropriated water in a stream, a
Id.
118.
119. Such terms may include requiring the company to conduct periodic water quality testing, change in design of the ponds, monitoring by an independent engineer, etc.
120. See ifra Part III.C. for a discussion of the water court's authority to deny a water right
based on water quality concerns.
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water user may appropriate water from the stream, water courts appear to read
the following limitation in Article XIV, Section 6: "the right to divert unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial use shall never be denied"
unless such diversion will injure seniorappropriators.For the reason discussed
below, this implicit no-injury limitation is the proper interpretation of the Colorado Constitution. Not only do the water courts already recognize the limitation, given the goals of the prior appropriation system and how an absolutist
interpretation of Article XIV, Section 6 may conflict with other provisions of
the Colorado Constitution,' not applying the limitation may lead to takings
challenges against water court decisions.'"
Water courts have already rejected an absolutist interpretation of Article
XVI, Section 6 and instead read in a limitation that prevents appropriation if
the appropriation will injure a senior appropriator.'" This implicit limitation
appears in cases in which a water court has refused to grant a new water right
without an augmentation plan, despite the fact there is unappropriated water in
the stream."' In those cases, the water court is preventing injury to the senior
appropriators' right to receive water in priority.'" The conditions that water
courts impose on new water rights to prevent injury to. senior appropriators
demonstrates the implicit limitation on the right to appropriate.'" Such conditions may infringe upon or even deny the right to divert unappropriated waters, but the courts have not taken issue with water court conditions as long as
they are in place to protect senior appropriators from injury.'"
The implicit limitation read into Article XIV, Section 6 also makes sense
given the purpose of the prior appropriation system. As discussed above, the
framers of the Colorado Constitution and the Colorado legislature adopted
121. As discussed infra, a strict interpretation of Article XVI, Section 6 could lead to a conflict with Article II, Section 15. For example, if the state applies for a water right that would
infringe upon the right of an appropriator to make continued normal use of their water, then a
strict interpretation of Article XIV, Section 6 would permit the state's appropriation despite the
negative externalities. This would lead to a conflict between Article XVI, Section 6 and Article
II, Section 15.
122. As discussed infra, a potential takings challenge could be made under Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010).
123. Fox v. Div. Eng'r for Water Div. 5, 810 P.2d 644, 645-46 (Colo. 1991); Se. Colorado
Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1984); Lionelle v. Se.
Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 676 P.2d 1162, 1167-68 (Colo. 1984); Bohn v. Kuiper, 575
P.2d 402, 403 (Colo. 1978).
124. Fr,810 P.2d at 645-46; Se. Colorado Water Conserancy Dist., 688 P.2d at 718;
Lionelle, 676 P.2d at 1167-68; Bohn, 575 P.2d at 403.
125. For example, in Fox v. Div. Eng'r for Water Div. 5, an applicant sought a conditional
underground water right for forty-five proposed tributary wells. 810 P.2d at 655. The water
court found that "unappropriated water may be in priority without the need for augmentation
for some periods," but nevertheless, the court granted a motion to dismiss concluding that submission of an augmentation plan was a prerequisite to an award of conditional water rights. Id.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Id. at 647.
126. See, e.g., Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Hines Highlands Ltd. P'ship, 929 P.2d 718,
725 (Colo. 1996) (water court imposed conditions designed to prevent out-of-priority depletions); City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 22, 47 (court imposed a volumetric limitation new water
right).
127. HInes Highlands Ltd P'shp,929 P.2d at 725.
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and developed the prior appropriation system to protect the water rights of
senior appropriators." Case law makes it clear that a junior appropriator can
injure a senior appropriator's right to make continued beneficial use of its water in both quantity and quality." Thus, insertion of the implicit limitation into
Article XIV, Section 6 that, even if unappropriated water is available, a potential junior appropriator may not appropriate if such appropriation will injure a
senior appropriator, is merely reading Article XIV, Section 6 in harmony with
the first in time-first in right principle.
There are many situations in which a water court may conclude that exercise of a new water right may impair the senior appropriator's right to water

quality. For example, adopting the facts of United States v. Gila Valley Irngation District assume a senior appropriator's intake of its direct-flow irrigation
right is located downstream of the proposed return flow of a new appropriator.
Further assume, that, like the upstream irrigators in Gila Valley, the return
flow of the new appropriation will increase the salt load of the stream and prevent the senior appropriator from continuing to grow salt sensitive crops, crops
which the senior appropriator has grown for decades. In this case, the water
court could deny the new appropriator's application on the grounds that it
would impair, if not destroy, the senior appropriator's right to continued normal use of his water."
The water court's denial of the water right in the above hypothetical is a
fair and just result. Despite the fact that there is unappropriated water in the
stream, a junior appropriator should not be permitted to destroy a senior right
by polluting a stream. The prior appropriation system is a property right system that protects senior rights from infringement by junior rights."' A new appropriator who pollutes the water and infringes upon or destroys a senior right
would undermine the prior appropriation system.
Not only is such a conclusion fair and just, the Colorado Constitution requires such a conclusion. To rebut the argument that Article XVI, Section 6
contains an implicit limitation on the right to unappropriated water, some will
argue that the express language Article XVI, Section 6 provides for no such
limitation. If one reads Article XVI, Section 6 in isolation, it indeed appears to
grant the unlimited right to divert unappropriated water. However, Colorado
courts do not read each individual provision of the Colorado Constitution in a
vacuum. Instead, the Colorado Supreme Court has made it clear "[tihe Constitution must be construed as a whole. Each provision should be construed if
128. VRANESH, supra note 12, at 17.
129. See, e.g., In re City and Cnty. of Denver v. Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 44 P.3d 1019, 1028
(Colo. 2002); City of Thornton, 926 P.2d at 91; Game and Fish Comm'n v. Farmers Irrigation
Co., 426 P.2d 562 (Colo. 1967); Slide Mines, Inc. v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 77 P.2d 125, 127
(Qolo. 1938); Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, 44 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Colo. 1934); Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 105 P. 1093, 1095 (Colo. 1909); Suffolk Gold Mining 80 Milling
Co., 48 P. 828, 830-32 (Colo. App. 1897); Cushman v. Highland Ditch Co., 33 P. 344, 345
(Colo. App. 1893).
130. See supra Part III.B for another example of when the water court may decide to condition or deny a new water right to protect a senior appropriator's right to continued receipt of
water of sufficient quality to make continued beneficial use.
131. Hobbs, supra note 12, at 2.
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possible to avoid any conflict between the different parts of the Constitution."'".
Given that a water right is protected from takings by Article II, Section 15,'"
reading Article XVI, Section 6 to guarantee the right to divert water when unappropriated water remains in a stream-regardless of whether that appropriation will infringe upon or destroy senior rights on that stream-would put the
two provisions in conflict with each other. This conflict may arise, for example,
if the State is applying for a junior water right, the exercise of which would
impair or destroy a senior right owned by a private citizen. In this situation, a
reading of Article XVI, Section 6 in a vacuum leads to the conclusion that the
State has an absolute right to divert water under the new water right despite
impairing a property right protected by Article II, Section 15. Such a conclusion pits Article XVI, Section 6 and Article II, Section 15 against each other, a
conclusion Colorado courts try to avoid.
In addition, reading Article XVI, Section 6 to confer on appropriator an
absolute right to divert water so long as unappropriated water remains in the
stream would lead to absurd results. Such a reading would leave the water
court in the position of saying that, while it recognizes water rights are protected by Article II, Section 15, Article XVI, Section 6 prevails and requires a
taking of the senior water right. Such a reading would lead to junior appropnators receiving the legal right to appropriate water despite the fact that it injures
a senior right. The better interpretation is to read the implicit qualifier into
Article XVI, Section 6 that the Colorado Supreme Court already recognizes
"the right to divert unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial
use shall never be denied" unless such diversion will injure senior appropriators.
Not only could an absolutist interpretation of Article XVI, Section 6 lead
to absurd results, it could permit the water court to work a judicial taking. In
the 2010 case Stop the Beach Renourhrnent,Inc. v. Florida Departmentof
Envionmental Protection, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court
found that the judicial branch may work a taking.'' The case demonstrates
possible grounds for a takings challenge if a water court's grant of a water right
infringes upon a senior appropriator's right to make continued beneficial use
of its water.
Before discussing Stop the Beach Renourishment,it is necessary to have a
basic understanding of federal takings law. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution proves that no "private property [shall] be taken for

132. Zaner v. City of Brighton, 899 P.2d 263, 267 (Colo. App. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
133. A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57, 62 (Colo. 1978) (Erikson, J., dissenting)
("The loss of the beneficial use of appropriated water, if the change is created by other users,
constitutes a taking of property rights acquired by a prior appropriator."); Fanners Irrigation Co.
v. Game & Fish Comn'n, 369 P.2d 557, 559-60 (Colo. 1962) ("A priority to the use of water for
irrigation or domestic purposes is a property right and as such is fully protected by the constitutional guaranties relating to property in general.").
134. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Enytl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2602
(2010).
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public use, without just compensation."" A taking can arise in various situations, one of which is eminent domain, which entitles the government to buy a
landowner's property in order to construct something for a public purpose (for
example, a highway, railroad, or utility). Takings can also arise in the context
of regulatory takings, which occur when a regulation has the effect of taking
private property for public use." In both cases, the government must pay the
landowner just compensation for the property taken.'"
In Stop the Beach Renouishmen4 the United States Supreme Court decided whether a decision by the Florida Supreme Court worked an unconstitutional taking." Florida common law provides that littoral owners" automatically take title to dry land added to their property by accretion." Under a Florida
beach restoration law,"' if a particular beach undergoes restoration activities, a
fixed line replaces the high-water line as the boundary between privately
owned littoral property and state property."' Any land added seaward of this
fixed line becomes property of the State."
A group of littoral landowners challenged a beach restoration permit application under Florida law that would have resulted in the addition of about
seventy-five feet of dry land seaward of the mean high-water mark."' Had this
land accreted, it would have been the property of the littoral owners, but because it was added artificially under beach restoration activities, it became
property of the State.'" Overturning the Florida appellate court, the Florida
Supreme Court held there was no taking." The littoral landowners appealed
135. See Chicago B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897) (noting that
the fourteenth amendment incorporates the fifth amendment takings clause).
136. The United States has developed substantial and complicated jurisprudence regarding
regulatory takings. In short, there two per se tests and a widely used balancing test. Any permanent physical invasion is a taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 426 (1982). Also, any complete diminution in economic value of property is a taking.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). If neither Loretto nor Lucas
applies, the court will apply the test from Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York under
which the court balances: (i) the character of the government action; (ii) the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant; and (iii) the extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
137. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 15.
138. Stop the Beach Renourishmen4 Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2600-01.
139. A littoral owner refers to an owner of land adjacent to the sea. BLACK'S LAW
DICnONARY 1018 (9th ed. 2009).
140. Stop the Beach Renounshment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2598 ("In order for an addition to
dry land to qualify as an accretion, it must have occurred gradually and imperceptibly-that is, so
slowly that one could not see the change occurring, though over time, the difference became
apparent.").
141. The Beach and Shore Preservation Act, 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61-246, as amended, Fla.
Stat. §§161.011-161.45 (2007).
142. Stop the Beach Renouishment,Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2599.
143. Id.
144. Id at2600.
145. Id. at 2598-99.
146. Id. at 2600. The Florida Court of Appeals held that the Florida Department of Environmental Protection's approval of the beach restoration permits submitted by the City of Destin and Walton County violated the rights of two private beach owners to receive accretions to
their property and right to have the contact of their property with the water remain intact. Save
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to the United States Supreme Court, arguing the Florida Supreme Court's
decision worked an unconstitutional taking."'
A plurality of the United States Supreme Court, consisting of the four justices generally considered to be the most conservative (ChiefJustice Roberts
and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) wrote that while there was no judicial
taking in this case, there is such a thing as a judicial taking.'" Defining what
constitutes a judicial taking, the plurality wrote that a judicial taking occurs
when "a courtdeclares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists."...
One can easily see how such a judicial taking (assuming such a thing actually exists) may apply in the context of a senior appropriator's right to continued receipt of clean water. If a water court granted a new water right, which
when exercised destroyed and/or infringed upon a senior appropriator's right
to make continued beneficial use of its water, the senior appropriator could
claim a judicial taking (in other words, the water court declared the established
right to make continued beneficial use of water no longer exists).
Not only does Stop the Beach Renounshnment create the potential for a
judicial taking under the United States Constitution if the water court does not
protect a senior appropriator's right to clean water, it raises the specter of a
judicial takings challenge under the Colorado Constitution. Article II, Section
15 of the Colorado Constitution provides "[pirivate property shall not be taken
or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation.". Water
rights are protected by Article II, Section 15."' While the Colorado Supreme
Court has yet to rule on whether there is such a thing as a judicial taking,"' the

Our Beaches, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 27 So.3d 48, 57 (2006).
The Florida Court of Appeals also certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court asking
whether the Beach and Shore Preservation Act "unconstitutionally deprive[s] upland owners of
littoral rights without just compensation." Walton City v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.,
998 So.2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 2008). The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question
in the negative and quashed the court of appeals' remand. Id. at 1121. The Court held that
doctrine of avulsion permitted the State to reclaim the restored beached on behalf of the public
and that there was no littoral right to contact with water independent of the littoral right of access, which the Act does not infringe. Id. at 1112, 1116-1120.
147. Stop the Beach Renouishment,Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2600-01.
148. Id.at 2601-02.
149. Id.
150. COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 15.
151. A-B Cattle Co. v. United States, 589 P.2d 57, 62 (Colo. 1978) (Erickson, J., dissenting)
(stating a change in beneficial use created by users other than the appropriator is a taking);
Farmers Irrigation Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 369 P.2d 557, 559-60 (Colo. 1962) (holding
constitutional guaranties fully protect the priority to put water to beneficial use as a property
right).
152. In La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hiderlider,the Colorado Supreme
Court does use the word "judicial takings" but it is not used in the context of whether a court
decision has worked a taking. Instead, the decision addresses whether the La Plata River Compact, which rotated water from the La Plata River among water users in both Colorado and New
Mexico, affected a taking of the appellant's Colorado water right. While the court did use the
word "judicial taking," the case only addresses whether the La Plata River Compact has worked
a taking. 25 P.2d 187, 188 (Colo. 1933).
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Court could, if properly confronted with the issue, conclude that such a species of takings exists.
Despite the apparent clear dictate of Article XVI, Section 6 of the Colorado Constitution that the right to appropriate water will never be denied, Colorado courts have been willing to deny new water rights when exercise of the
water right will cause injury to senior appropriators." This is based on the
common-sense limitation that must be read into Article XVI, Section 6 to fully
protect senior appropriators and avoid the absurd result of interpreting two
constitutional provisions to directly conflict with each other.'" Although the
Colorado courts have yet to address a situation in which an application for a
new water right was denied solely because it would impair the water quality
right of a senior appropriator, the water courts do have such authority. Finally,
the water courts should be cognizant that if they stray from enforcing the implicit limitation that it has read into Article XVI, Section 6, senior water right
holders may raise the novel issue of judicial takings under the United States
Constitution and/or the Colorado Constitution.

IV. THE WQCA AND ITS EFFECT ON THE WATER COURT'S
AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS WATER QUALITY ISSUES
The final issue that must be addressed is whether the WQCA limits in any
way the water court's authority to protect water quality. This discussion first
requires an exploration of the WQCA and its interaction with the 1969 Act.
Under the 1969 Act, a water court has exclusive jurisdiction over "water
matters" and "[wlater matters shall include only those matters which [the 1969
Act] and any other law shall specify to be heard by the water judge of the district courts."'" A water court also has ancillary jurisdiction to resolve matters
that would directly affect the outcome of matters over which it has exclusive
jurisdiction," which includes matters implied by the Colorado Constitution
and statutes."' "Water matters" involve determinations regarding the right to
use water'" and limitations on the use of a decreed water right."' As demonstrated by numerous cases in which the water courts have conditioned and/or
153. See, e.g., Fox v. Div. Eng'r for Water Div. 5, 810 P.2d 644, 645-46 (Colo. 1991); Se.
Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1984); Lionelle v.
Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 676 P.2d 1162, 1167-68 (Colo. 1984); Bohn v. Kuiper, 575
P.2d 402, 403 (Colo. 1978).
154. See discussionsupra note 122.
155. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-203(1). The water court also has ancillary jurisdiction to
resolve matters that would directly affect the outcome of matters over which it has exclusive
jurisdiction. Crystal Lakes Water & Sewer Ass'n v. Backlund, 908 P.2d 534, 543 (Colo. 1996).
156. CrystalLakes Water and Sewer,908 P.2d at 543.
157. Oliver v. Dist. Ct. of Boulder Cnty., 549 P.2d 770, 771 (Colo. 1976) (holding a water
court had authority to hear suit for injunction predicated on the theory of nuisance and breach
of covenant). For example, in Perdue v. FortLyon Canal Co., the Colorado Supreme Court
held that the 1969 Act and the Colorado Constitution provided a water judge the jurisdiction to
determine the effect of a prior contract upon the priorities awarded. 519 P.2d 954 (Colo. 1974).
158. Tonko v. Mallow, 154 P.3d 397, 404 (Colo. 2007) (citing Crystal Lake Water & Sewage, 908 P.2d at 540).
159. Kobobel v. State, 215 P.3d 1218, 1220 (Colo. App. 2009).
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denied applications for new water rights in order to protect senior appropiators, the water courts have interpreted "water matters" to include the protection of the rights of senior appropriators from the exercise of new junior
rights.'" The question, then, is: Does the WQCA somehow deny the water
court the authority to address externalities caused by the exercise of junior
rights that affect water quality rights of senior appropriators?
The General Assembly passed the WQCA in 1989 in response to the
federal Clean Water Act,"' and it has the following purpose:
[T]o prevent injury to beneficial uses made of state waters, to maximize beneficial uses of water, and to develop waters to which Colorado and its citizen
are entitled and, within this context, to achieve the maximum practical degree
of water quality in the waters of the state consistent with the welfare of the
state.'"

ITIo conserve state waters and to protect, maintain, and improve, where necessary and reasonable, the quality thereof for public water supplies, for protection and propagation of wildlife and aquatic life, for domestic, agricultural,
industrial, and recreational uses, and for other beneficial uses, taking into
consideration the requirements of such uses; to provide that no pollutant be
released into any state waters without first receiving the treatment or other
corrective action necessary to reasonably protect the legitimate and beneficial
uses of such waters; to provide for the prevention, abatement, and control of
new or existing water pollution."
An in depth discussion of the WQCA is beyond the scope of this article;
however, a working understanding is necessary. Under the WQCA, the Water
Quality Control Commission has various duties, including developing and
maintaining "a comprehensive and effective program for prevention, control,
and abatement of water pollution" and for protecting water quality throughout
the state.'" This includes the duty to promulgate water quality standards,'" control regulations,'" and permit regulations." In addition, the WQCA prohibits
"discharge"" of any "pollutant"'" into any state water from a "point source""'

160. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Ltd. P'ship, 929 P.2d 718, 725
(Colo. 1996); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 97 (Colo. 1996); Fox v. Div.

Eng'r for Water Div., 810 P.2d 644, 645-46 (Colo. 1991); Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. V.
City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1984); Lionelle v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist., 676 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Colo. 1984); Bohn v. Kuiper, 575 P.2d 402, 403 (Colo. 1978).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1251, etseq.
162. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-102(1) (2012).
163. Id.§ 25-8-102(1)-(2).
164. Id. § 25-8-202(1).
165. Id. § 2 5-8-204(2)(a)-(j).
166. Id. § 25-8-205(1).
167. Id. §§ 25-8-501 to -504.

168. Id. S 25-8-103(3) ("Discharge of pollutants" is defined as "the introduction or addition
of a pollutant into state waters").
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"without first having obtained a permit from the [Department of Public
Health] for such discharge.""' Permits generally allow the holder to discharge a
certain amount of "pollution" into state waters. Violations of the WQCA may
subject violators to both civil'" and criminal penalties."'
Notably, the WQCA does not prevent the water courts from addressing
water quality. In City & County of Denver, the Colorado Supreme Court, interpreting the WQCA, held "the WQCA explicitly preserves a water court's
authority over the question of injury to senior appropriators and the appropriate remedies for such injuries."' To reach this conclusion, the Court relied in
part on the following provision in the WQCA:
No provision of this articles shall be interpreted so as to supercede, abrogate,
or impair rights to divert water and apply water to beneficial uses in accordance with Section 5 and Section 6 of article XVI of the constitution of the
State of Colorado .

.

. or the Colorado court determinations with respect to

the determination and administration of water rights."
While the facts of City & County ofDenver dealt specifically with augmentation plans and whether substitute water was of sufficient quality for the use by
another appropriator under Section 37-92-305(5) of the Colorado Revised
Statutes, the Court did not limit its holding to the context of augmentation
plans and the 1969 Act. Instead, the Court cited the "common law theory
based on the prior appropriation doctrine that prohibits the discharge of contaminates into streams where doing so makes the water unsuitable for an appropriator's nonnal use of the water" and came to the broad conclusion that
the water court may address water quality when necessary to protect other
appropriators."
While one may interpret City & County ofDenver narrowly as only allowing the water courts to address water quality when expressly granted such authority under the 1969 Act, such a conclusion is inconsistent with the broad
language of the statute and the role of the water courts. The opinion contains
very broad language that seems to pernut a water court to address water quality
even when the 1969 Act does not expressly permit or require it to do so."'
Additionally, as discussed above, water courts often inquire as to whether a

169. Id. § 25-8-103(15) (defining "pollutant" as "dredged spoil, dirt, slurry, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, sewage sludge, garbage, trash, chemical waste, biological nutrient, biological material, radioactive material, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, or any
industrial, municipal, or agricultural waste").
170. Id. at (14) (defining "point source" as "any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance . . . 'Point source' does notinclude irrigation return flow") (emphasis added).
171. Id. S 25-8-501(1).
172. Id. 25-8-608(1).
173. Id. 25-8-609(1)(a).
174. Plan for Augmentation of the City & Cnty. of Denver exrelBd. of Water Comm'rs, 44
P.3d 1019, 1029 (Colo. 2002).
175. CoLo. REv. STAT. S 25-8-104(1).
City& Cnty ofDenver, 44 P.3d at 1028.
176.
177. Id. at 1018-29.
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new appropriation will harm senior appropriators."' Such harm is usually con-

sidered in the context of water quantity, not quality, however, if the exercise of
a new water right impairs the right of a senior appropriator to a certain quality
of water, this is harm a water court may and should address. Recognizing that
the water courts have the authority to prevent harm to senior appropriators, it
makes little sense to read City & County ofDenver narrowly to say that water
courts may address water quality injuries to senior appropriators only when
expressly permitted by the -1969 Act. This would be inconsistent with how the
water courts have routinely protected senior water rights from injury without
express statutory authority to do so."
Such a narrow interpretation of City & County of Denver would also be
contrary to a century of case law that protects a senior appropriator's right to
make continued beneficial use of its water, as discussed above. Similarly, such
an interpretation would leave the water quality rights of senior appropriators
unprotected in some situations. The WQCA only requires a discharge permit
for "point sources," which is defined in the WQCA to explicitly exclude "agricultural return flows."" Thus, the situation that occurred in Gda Valley (that
agricultural return flows destroyed a downstream senior appropriator's right to
make continued beneficial use of its water) would not be remedied by the
WQCA. Therefore, concluding the WQCA does not permit the water courts
to protect such rights of downstream senior appropriators produces an absurd
result in which a junior appropriator's operation of its water right is allowed to
infringe upon and/or destroy a senior. appropriator's right to make continued
beneficial use of its water.
Additionally, even if operation of a junior water right does result in the
discharge of pollutants into a stream via a point source, which necessitates the
procurement of a discharge permit, compliance with a discharge permit does
not necessarily fully protect downstream water user. For example, consider a
hypothetical based on the facts in Game and Fish Conmission v. Farmers
Irnation Company, in which the Court held defendant liable for damages
caused by discharges from fish hatchery that rendered plaintiffs domestic water right unusable for domestic purposes, and enjoined the* defendant from
continuing such discharges.'
Assume that the case arose today rather than in 1967 and that the discharges were made pursuant to a WQCA discharge permit Concluding a water court cannot fully protect the downstream appropriator's right to make
continued domestic use of its water, merely because the fish hatchery has a
discharge permit, would leave the downstream appropriator's rights unprotected-despite the fact that Colorado prior appropriation law would have protect178. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Ltd. P'ship, 929 P.2d 718, 725
(Colo. 1996); City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 19 (Colo. 1996); Fox v. Div.
Eng'r for Water Div., 810 P.2d 644, 645-46 (Colo. 1991); Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v.
City of Florence, 688 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1984); Lionelle v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy
DisL, 676 P.2d 1162, 1167-68 (Colo. 1984); Bohn v. Kuiper, 575 P.2d 402, 403 (Colo. 1978).
179. See discussion supra Part III.B.
180. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 25-8-103(14).
181. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Farmers Irrigation Co., 426 P.2d 562, 566 (Colo. 1967).
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ed the appropriator's right to make continued domestic use of its water. Such a
conclusion is not only unfair because it permits a junior appropriator to destroy the rights of a senior appropriator, the WQCA expressly provides that it
shall not be interpreted to "supercede, abrogate, or impair the rights to divert
water and to apply water to beneficial uses."'" This language indicates the Colorado General Assembly did not intend the terms of a discharge permit to
overturn a century of well-established Colorado prior appropriation law and
allow a discharge permit to be used as a shield against the water court's authority.
The WQCA does not prevent water courts from protecting the right of
senior appropriators to make continued beneficial use of their water. This
conclusion results from the plain language of the statute and the conclusions of
the Colorado Supreme Court in City & County ofDen ver. This conclusion is
also the only way to achieve full protection of the right of senior appropriators
to make continued beneficial use of their water.
V. CONCLUSION
Colorado prior appropriation law protects a senior appropriator's right to
clean water. The level of clean water is determined by the appropriator's historic beneficial use. To fully protect their clients' water rights, Colorado water
law practitioners must understand that the water courts have the authority to
protect a senior appropriator's right to make continued beneficial use of its
water, both in quality and quantity. Regulation of water quality is not solely
within the authority of the Water Quality Control Commission. Instead, the
water court has the authority to protect water quality whenever the exercise of
a water right may infringe on an appropriator's right to make continued beneficial use of its water. Such authority is not limited by the terms of the 1969
Act or the Colorado Constitution. If the water court fails to protect the right to
make continued beneficial use of water, it is not only failing to fully protect all
aspects of a water right under Colorado law, it is potentially exposing itself to
takings claims. It is time for the Colorado water law community to advance
beyond the oversimplified and inaccurate view that prior appropriation law
protects water quantity while WQCA protects water quality. The water law
community must fully recognize the scope of a water right under Colorado
water law and strategies available to protect it.

182.

CoLo.

REv. STAT.

§ 25-8-104(1).
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